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His recognition of the claims of order with respect to human action that
is not merely communicative, and their impact in turn upon freedom of
communication itself, seems to touch upon the slogan of fraternity, although he does not use the word. He does in terms designate as democratic ideals the notions of individual dignity, freedom, and equality.
Surely the tensions between freedom and equality and between fraternity
and freedom provide space for wide choice of instrumental values, and
even embodiment of contradictory ones in law.
Your reviewer would propose that the claims of privacy not be ignored, in terms of individual dignity, in estimating the claims of learning.
He would also register skepticism, although regretfully, that the powers
of reason can achieve a recurrent consensus in the application of these
ideals to experience, in the process of discovering limits to choice of
values in law. This is not to gainsay the priority assigned to discussionand-vote over industrial or military might. This priority is a worthy
choice among human values, and may contain more for survival than cold
wars of goods or of arms.
Not a call for revolution, not a debate, but a workmanlike effort to
apply reason, in the twentieth century, to Western experience.
IVAN C. RUTLEDGEt

URBAN PLANNING AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC POLICY.

H. Webster.1 New York: Harper & Brothers.
$8.00.

1958.

By Donald

Pp. xii, 572.

That America has become an urban society is an accomplished twentieth century fact. With the completion of the new interstate highway
network, not only will the smallest county seat be brought closer to its city
brother but suburban development at the interchanges is expected to project the urban sprawl even farther into the rural countryside. Accordingly, it is high time for the lawyer, if he has not already done so, to
pay attention to the ever-multiplying regulation of land use by towns,
cities, and counties. As an introduction to the background and content
of urban land use controls, this book can be most helpful.
Professor Webster's book is divided into four parts. Part I deals
with the governmental framework of planning. To the reader who is
at all versed in the organization of local government this section is an
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. Professor of Political Science, University of Washington.
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elementary but thorough primer. In Part II the author discusses the
subject matter of planning, and briefly reviews the nature of land uses
within the municipality and the basic governmental services that must be
a part of any comprehensive municipal plan. Entitled "Plan Implementation," Part III is the most satisfactory part of the book. After recounting the basic regulatory and governmental powers necessary to the
implementation of planning, including the power to build and finance
public improvements, the author considers zoning, subdivision control,
and urban renewal in detail. Unfortunately, some of this material duplicates Part II. Part IV, a brief inquiry into the future of planning, is
uninspired and leaves much to be desired considering the nature of the
pressing problems that confront municipal governments in the planning
area.
The expository and non-critical approach adopted by the author suggests that he wrote the book for use as a basic text in planning and related courses. As such, it can be helpful either to the law student or to
the practicing lawyer who wants to acquire basic information in this area.
There are few errors, and most are errors of omission. For example, in
his discussion of annexation2 the author does not seem to be aware of the
variety of statutory procedures now available, nor of the advances that
have been made to facilitate the expansion of major cities. Elsewhere,
his attention to procedural problems is insufficient to be of real use to
the practitioner.
Perhaps the book's major difficulty lies in the level at which Professor Webster chooses to discuss his subject. In presenting his material
he alternates between expansive generality and trivial detail. For example, the reader is told on the one hand how to set up a house-numbering
system,3 and on the other is given the usual ambiguous and tautological
precepts in explanation of the legal basis for land use regulation.' As
a consequence, the author leaves unexplored that "middle level" of concept, standard and value at which planners, lawyers and courts must
operate if they wish intelligently to tie fact and generalization together.
Harold Lasswell has spoken of the creative ambiguity that necessarily inheres in the process of judicial decision. Nowhere is the potential for creative ambiguity greater than in the field of municipal law. A
possible explanation may lie in the fact that the origins of municipal law
concepts can be traced to constitutional provisions that necessarily are
2. WEBSTER, URBAN PLANNING AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC POLICY 56-59 (1958).

3. Id. at 179.
4. "Is there a public interest to justify the regulation? . . . Does the regulation
involve a constitutional right? . . . Is the regulation reasonable?" Id. at 271.
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broadly phrased and that consequently are ambiguous in content. Zoning
presents a case in point.
While it is true that a decision on the validity of a zoning ordinance
is predicated on the due process clause of the federal or applicable state
constitution, the generalized language of these provisions keeps them
from serving as a sufficient tool in the decisional process. As a consequence, the courts have been forced to descend to the "middle level" to
find the ideas and concepts that are necessary for decision. These judicial
responses are passed off as interpretive of the general welfare requirements of due process, but in fact their content is non-legal. Spot zoning
provides an example. In passing on the constitutionality of ordinances of
this type the courts have often considered such factors as the relationship
between spot zoning and the control of nonconforming uses; the use of
spot zoning to introduce considerations into the ordinance unrelated
directly to land use, such as the need for garden apartments to alleviate
an urban housing shortage; and the use of spot zoning as a quasiadministrative technique to moderate the rigidity of use classifications
when the variance process might not be available on a strict interpretation
of hardship. This is only a partial list.
Professor Webster never comes to grips with these judicial realities.
For example, in his discussion of public purpose as a justification for the
exercise of the power of taxation and eminent domain he equivocates and
never arrives at a satisfactory statement of the present judicial position
on this point.5 By way of comparison, in discussing the validity of spot
zoning he eventually takes refuge in the same vague public welfare referents which he had originally postulated as the underlying constitutional
basis for the exercise of the zoning power in full.6 These examples are
all the more interesting because the author elsewhere' recognizes and
discusses, at least in part, the impact of Berman v. Parker,' the United
States Supreme Court case which upheld the validity of the District of
Columbia urban redevelopment law. He notes that the Supreme Court
in that case adopted an expansive attitude toward the function both of
the eminent domain and the police power, primarily by recognizing that
aesthetic considerations have a proper place in municipal planning. But
the impact of this case is twofold, inasmuch as the Court also indicated
that in passing on the exercise of either public function it would ordinarily defer to the legislative determination.
5.

WEBSTER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 275.

6. Id. at 366.
7. Id. at 422.
8. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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In defense of this book it must be said that it was not intended as a
legal treatise. But this discussion has indicated that the considerations
underlying the "law" in the area of land use controls are non-legal in the
orthodox sense. Accordingly, law and planning policy cannot be disentangled. Because he does not adequately explore their interrelationship,
Professor Webster's book is not as satisfactory as it might otherwise be.
Even so, the author has prepared an adequate textbook introduction to
the problems of planning and land use.
DANIEL R. MANDELKERt Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis
Division.

